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Twenty years ago I compared Zen Buddhism to the work of 
Wittgenstein.1 2The resemblances then noted between them, though I 
still think that they can be seen, might be called superficial. For I have 
since practiced Zen in a temple in Japan and know that there is a profound 
difference between it and the work of Wittgenstein—a difference that 
goes below the cultural, linguistic, and other dissimilarities that mark these 
two phenomena. This great difference is that with Wittgenstein philosophy 
or the pursuit of wisdom is an intellectual affair, whereas in Eastern 
Buddhism it is an affair of the whole person. The two phenomena resemble 
each other in that there is in each a distinctive method as well as a common 
“problem.” But in Wittgenstein’s work the method is mental; in Ch’an 
Buddhism it is sitting-meditation, together with the aids for meditation, 
particularly the koan, that have been gradually worked out over the 
centuries. Wittgenstein pursued the “complete clarity” to which he refers in 
Philosophical Investigations by the use of the words. The Ch’an Buddhist 
pursues the “awakening” or “enlightenment” to which he refers by a 
physical cum mental activity: sitting-meditation?
1 “Zen and the Work of Wittgenstein,” Chicap Review 12, no. 2 (Summer 1958).
2 Resemblances between Buddhism and Wittgenstein have been recently struck in 
Chris Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism (New York, 1977). Gudmunsen, however, 
restricts himself to Indian Buddhism and the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investiga­
tions. My remarks concern Eastern, particularly Ch’an Buddhism, and all of Witt­
genstein’s philosophical investigations as these were given form in Tractatus Logico- 
Philosophicus (hereafter referred to as the Tractatus), Notebooks 1914-1916, The Blue and 
Brown Books, Philosophical Investigations (hereafter referred to as PI), and Remarks on the 
Foundations of Mathematics.
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Despite this necessarily remarkable difference, as well as the cultural 
and other differences, between Eastern Buddhism and Wittgenstein’s 
investigations, however, it is possible to see several common features, if 
not to note resemblances, in the two. My purpose in doing this now is 
that I may thereby attempt to shed some light on another way of being 
consciously (sic), and therefore on what it is to be humanly (sic).3 My 
ground for observing these features is the human situation and not some 
particular cultural or philosophical, Eastern or Western, context to which 
the Buddhist is or Wittgenstein was reacting.4
3 Sec the author’s The Radical Spinoza (New York, 1979). The importance of the 
adverbs in place of adjectives will be felt in what follows.
* Gudmunsen, for example, indicates that Wittgenstein was reacting to Russell and 
Moore, the Midhyamikas to Abhidharma Buddhism, and says that Moore, Russell, 
and Abhidharma Buddhism all assumed that “words ‘imply’ objects behind them” 
(p. 34)» that language functioned by means of a particular mechanism: the
word as noun, or what I have elsewhere called "the naming relation” (cf. note 5).
I add that I find Mr. Gudmunsen’s comparisons between Wittgenstein and the 
M£dhyamikas both interesting and apt. They also seem to me to throw light on what 
each was doing. However, Mr. Gudmunsen does not note the great difference between 
the Buddhist, particularly Eastern, and Wittgenstein to which I have called attention. 
He thereby, or so it seems to me, misses another profound similarity: each was or is 
working at becoming more human; and in the case of at least Eastern Buddhism and 
the later Wittgenstein had developed and emphasized a particular and powerful method 
for doing so.
Nor does Mr. Gudmunsen face the question: to what is any Buddhist of any century 
or anyone whom Wittgenstein taught reacting? It is not that the context in which any 
activity occurs is unimportant. Indeed, the context and the activity are inseparable. It 
is rather a question of which of the many contexts in which any activity occurs one 
must consider for further understanding of the activity.
“Religion,” said Goto Roshi, "is garbed by the time, the place, and the nature of the 
people who have it” (the author’s The Matter of Zen, New York, 1964, p. 125; but it is 
everywhere the same). Thus, it might be said that Wittgenstein’s reaction to Russell 
and Moore garbed his investigations. But it was he himself who constituted their body. 
This is the context of being humanly.
The reader, finally, should keep in mind the difference between the teacher and the 
pupil in both Buddhism and the work of Wittgenstein. To what context is the pupil 
reacting ?
The common features in the work of each which I shall note are: a 
move toward non-dualism; a distinctive though different method for 
accomplishing the work; the repetition in it; the notion that the task is 
impossible; talk in the work of tranquillity; the encounters with con- *I
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tradiction, and the notion of substance; the pragmatism in each; the 
encounter with the notion of essence; talk of clarity and light rather than 
knowledge; and the encounter with the notion of the I, the ego, or 
identity. The encounters with these features sometimes produced remark­
able similarities of expression and metaphor. Some of these will be noted, 
but mainly I am concerned with the fact that the work of the Buddhists 
and Wittgenstein include these features.
i
Before turning to these features, I shall make some general observations 
about Wittgenstein’s own development in his investigations. This is 
necessary because there is a number of interpretations of his work, all of 
them more or less plausible, and we should be sure of the Wittgenstein of 
which we are thinking in the present context. Thus, without being 
exhaustive, it is often believed that there is the Wittgenstein of the 
Tractates and the Wittgenstein of the PZ, or the earlier and the later 
Wittgenstein. For some who believe this, the earlier Wittgenstein held 
one view of language, the later another. For some others who believe this, 
the later Wittgenstein was critical of the earlier. For still others, the 
earlier was concerned with logic and the later with language. There are 
also those who believe that Wittgenstein finally developed a view of 
philosophy according to which philosophy consists of puzzlements gener­
ated by language when it “goes on a holiday” or is misused {PI 38). For 
some of these, there is, then, philosophy old-style and new philosophy, 
the practice of which is the dissolution of these puzzles or puzzlements. 
For others, philosophical statements old-style were actually linguistic 
recommendations and philosophy new-style consists in getting clearer 
about this and, therefore, doing it better. For still others, Wittgenstein had 
worked toward a new theory of language according to which language is 
instrumental or functional, not merely a means of communication. There 
is also the view according to which Wittgenstein performed an analysis of 
language similar to that which Kant performed on thought.
Evidence for each of these views can be supplied by citing from 
Wittgenstein’s writings. Each is more or less plausible and I do not wish 
to say that any of them is wrong. I want to indicate that I read Wittgen­
stein differently and how I do. I do not suggest that my reading is the 
correct one. Like all bodies of important philosophical work, Wittgenstein’s 
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is fecund. Many plants can be made to grow from it. I only wish to indicate 
the Wittgenstein whom I am comparing with Eastern Buddhism.
Briefly, then, Wittgenstein’s development may be seen as follows. He 
entered philosophy by the keep of her Western castle: logic. Starting 
from such questions as: what is a necessary truth? a contradiction? a 
proposition? the status of a negative proposition? he moved on to question 
generally the relation of language to fact. This resulted in the theory in the 
Tractates that language is composed of propositions, propositions of words, 
and that propositions picture facts.
The theory answered the problems which led to it. A necessary truth is 
a tautology, a proposition all of whose truth-values are true. A contradic­
tion is a proposition all of whose truth-values are false. A proposition is a 
propositional sign, that is, a spoken or written sentence and not something 
which a sentence seems to name. A negative proposition is a sentence on 
which the operation of negation has been performed.
Unfortunately the theory had consequences the undesirability of which 
was as extreme as the consequences were obscure. By an analysis, on the 
well-springs of which we can only speculate, Wittgenstein found that his 
theory of language depended on an assumption which it seemed impossible 
to question but which rendered the theory, when carried to its logical con­
clusion, a theory according to which language is impossible. The strangled 
cry at the end of the Trarto/w had been prophetic as well as didactic. 
“Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.” According to 
this theory one cannot speak.
The assumption in question is that the only genuine words are (proper) 
names.5 The Tractates had served only to expose a deeper problem than 
those it solved. They were but the way in to the Minotaur.
9 The demonstration that it leads to the contradiction that language is impossible is 
given in the author’s “Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation,” Inquiry 7, no. 4 (1964).
There had to commence, then, an analysis of the assumption that gen­
uine words are names. (Logical and grammatical “words” like “not” 
and “the” are not words. They are linguistic operators.) If the relation of 
language to fact is to be understood, precisely what we seem forced to 
consider as the relation, the naming relation, has to be questioned. 
Furthermore, it has to be seen through, for it involves a fundamental 
contradiction. [“The civil status of a contradiction . . . : there is the 
philosophical problem” (PI 125). Wittgenstein had come to wonder: how
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can a word not be a word ?] This work issued in The Blue and Brown Books, 
PI, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, and others. It led to the 
result: language does not have a relation to fact. It has a multitude of 
relations and they are of enormous variety. One cannot specify, then, the 
relation of language to fact. The belief that one can was seen to be an il­
lusion. There are languages not language. This work involved the develop­
ment of a radically new and powerful kind of philosophical “analysis.”
The movement of Wittgenstein’s thought was, however, more complex 
and at the same time profounder and more spiritual than the foregoing 
indicates. For another of the problems with which he started was that of 
avoiding the conceptual realism (Platonism) of Frege and Russell. The 
Tractatus seemed to accomplish this until the difficulty with the idea of the 
naming relation became apparent. When this occurred, it was also seen 
that this idea required that there be minds in the Cartesian sense. By 
seeing that the proposition is the propositional sign and not something that 
the latter names (means) Wittgenstein had reduced the necessity of 
thinking that there is a mind, or that which is aware of the proposition 
when it is thought of as the meaning of a sentence or propositional sign. 
But this was of little avail, since the notion of the meaning of a word 
(another Platonic entity) similarly requires that there be minds which 
perceive the meanings of words. And thus it is that the opening line of the 
first of the later works, The Blue Book, reads: “What is the meaning of a 
word ?” The idea of the naming relation and, therefore, the Tractatus are 
inextricably interwoven with mind-body dualism. As Wittgenstein says 
in the middle of The Blue Book: “This is a hint as to how the problem of 
the two materials, mind and matter, is going to dissolve.”6
6 “At first sight it may appear (but why it should can only become clear later) that 
here we have two kinds of worlds, worlds built of different materials; a mental world 
and a physical world. The mental world in fact is liable to be imagined as gaseous, or 
rather, aethereal. [Descartes: “I did not stop to consider what the soul was, or if I did 
stop, 1 imagined that it was something extremely rare and subtle like a wind, a flame or 
an ether . . .” Meditation n.] But let me remind you here of the queer role which the 
gaseous and aetherial play in philosophy,—when we perceive that a substantive is not 
used as what in general we should call the name of an object, and when therefore we 
can’t help saying to ourselves that it is the name of an aetherial object. I mean, we 
already know the idea of 'aetherial objects’ as a subterfuge, when we are embarrased 
about the grammar of certain words, and when all we know is that they are not used as 
names for material objects. This is a hint as to how . . . dissolve.” nb: “dissolve.”
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After the lesson of the Tractatus was absorbed Wittgenstein, therefore, 
was confronted with a new “problem” which had lain largely unsuspected 
on the way of his quest. At that time it must have seemed that conceptual 
realism was unavoidable, that language and fact, mind and body, cannot 
be related.
To put the matter in another way, it could have appeared that a human 
is a being alien in this world. That is to say that I, Wittgenstein, am alien. 
[Russell one night in 1912: What are you thinking of, logic or your sins? 
Wittgenstein: Both.7 And in the Notebooks* “The I, the I is what is deeply 
mysterious!” (p. 80).] But the facts indicate the reverse. The problem 
thereby becomes that of seeing through an illusion. Wittgenstein called it a 
“picture [that] held us captive” (PI 115). Thus as his work continued there 
developed an attack on an illusion: the idea of the naming relation.8 9
7 Bertrand Russell, Portraits from Memory (London, 1956), p. 27.
• That is Wittgenstein’s form of the illusion—though he did speak of the mysterious­
ness of the I. In my opinion the illusion assumes various garbs, for example, the illusion 
of the self.
9 See The Radical Spinoza.
There is another aspect of the deeper reaches of Wittgenstein’s work. 
It is related to his resistance to conceptual realism and to the fact that one 
of his main “problems,” without appearing to be such at first, was mind­
body dualism. He was in his work moving all of his life to what might be 
called a “radically empirical outlook.” In his case, for I think that this is 
the philosophic or human goal, the struggle was engaged on the narrow 
field of the problem of the relation of language to fact. Perhaps it might 
be said that this was the artistic and articulate form that Wittgenstein’s 
philospphic quest took. In Spinoza it had the form of attempting to under­
stand God? In other philosophers the form has been different.
By “a radically empirical outlook” I mean being able to see the world 
for what it is. This means being able to take it as experience presents it: 
a realm of particular things capable of infinite diversity. In Wittgenstein’s 
case a non-empirical entity, of which there is talk but through which he 
first tried to see, was the proposition as distinct from the spoken or written 
sentence; that is, the so-called meaning of the spoken or written sentence. 
This occupied his attention through the writing of the Tractates.
The attempt was successful. Wittgenstein came to a view in the form of 
a theory of language according to which there are no propositions, only 
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spoken and written sentences, and hence no need for a mind to perceive 
the latter’s meanings. Unfortunately, as noted, this view contained a 
fundamental defect. The theory required that the basic elements of sen­
tences be words which have meanings, and meanings turn out to be the 
non-empirical entities which have been called “universals” and which 
are apprehended by a non-empirical or an incorporeal mind. The quest 
therefore had to be pursued further. The renewed struggle occupied the 
rest of Wittgenstein’s life. It resulted in PI in which Wittgenstein was 
finally able to see the relation of language to fact in such wise that no 
illusion clouded his vision. He had seen through universals and the mind. 
The outcome, which he foresaw as “complete clarity,” was a view of the 
world as composed wholly of particular things. How far he also saw com­
pletely through the I, I am unable to say.10
10 Although we are not concerned with this aspect, the times of Wittgenstein’s growing 
up and working may be noted since they made the garb for the body of his investigations. 
There had been Darwin’s Origin of Sfectes (Plato’s true beings, the forms, are not eternal). 
Nietzsche had proclaimed God dead. Russell and others had abandoned the subject­
predicate analysis of sentences in favor of seeing sentences as having the form of proposi­
tional functions (i.e., relational logic had appeared). William James had asked “Does 
Consciousness Exist?*’ and had answered no. But conscious behavior does. John Dewey 
had developed the instrumental theory of knowledge and abandoned the representa­
tional. There was the new physics, quantum, and Bohr’s idea of complementarity in 
which the age-old principle of identity was abandoned (see again The Radical Spinoza}. 
In writing, the stream-of-consciousness novel had made its appearance, and in art non- 
representational painting. Freud had been talking of the unconscious wish (i.e., the 
notion of the conscious was expanding).
Although there are two strains of thought in the Tractates > it is mainly a 
piece of straightforward logical analysis. In the later works something 
entirely different appears. “Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by 
examples; and the series of examples can be broken off-—Problems are 
solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
“There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, 
like different therapies” (PI 133).
In The Blue Book Wittgenstein had said, “This is a hint as to how the 
problem of the two materials ... is going to dissolve” (p. 47, emphasis 
added). The hint is that general names (common nouns) are not names. 
See this, and mind-body dualism begins to dissolve (see note 6).
Clearly the turning of philosophy into a method and the comparison of 
the latter to a therapy, together with the notion that problems are to be 
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dissolved rather than solved are indications that something radically dif­
ferent from what is ordinarily thought of as philosophical analysis is going 
on in Wittgenstein’s later work. To confirm this let us look at two of his 
examples.
“If I give someone the order ‘fetch me a red flower from that meadow,’ 
how is he going to know what sort of flower to bring, as I have only given 
him a word?
“Now the answer one might suggest first is that he went to look for a red 
flower carrying a red image in his mind, and comparing it with the flowers 
to see which of them had the color of that image. Now there is such a way of 
searching, and it is not at all essential that the image we use should be a 
mental one. In fact the process may be this: I carry a chart coordinating 
names and colored squares. When I hear the order ‘fetch me, etc.’ I draw 
my finger across the chart from the word ‘red’ to a certain square, and I 
go and look for a flower which has the same color as the square. But this 
is not the only way of searching and it is not the usual way. We go, look 
about us, walk up to a flower and pick it, without comparing it to anything. 
To see that the process of the order can be of this kind, consider the order 
'imagine a red patch.’ You are not tempted in this case to think that before 
obeying you must have an image of a red patch to serve you as a pattern for 
the red patch which you were ordered to imagine” (p. 3).
Later in The Brown Book Wittgenstein said, “Thus we are inclined to 
say: ‘A man must understand an order before he obeys it.* *’ The order 
“imagine a red patch” shows us that this is not the case. On the same page 
Wittgenstein writes:
“Let us ask the question: Suppose I had explained to someone the word 
‘red’ (or the meaning of the word ‘red’) by having pointed to various red 
objects and given the ostensive explanation.—What does it mean to say 
‘Now if he has understood the meaning, he will bring me a red object if I 
ask him to’ ? This seems to say: If he has really got hold of what is common 
between all the objects I have shown him, he will be in a position to follow 
my order. But what is it that is in common to these objects ?
“Can you tell me what it is in common between a light red and a dark 
red? Compare with this the following case: I show you two pictures of 
two different landscapes. In both pictures, amongst many other objects, 
there is the picture of a bush, and it is exactly alike in both. I ask you 
‘Point to what these two pictures have in common,* and as an answer 
you point to the bush” (p. 130).
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Talking about these examples, trying to explain them, is like explaining 
the point of a joke. If you have to do it, something has gone wrong. 
Nevertheless, I will say that with each of these examples something 
happens. The order “imagine a red patch” makes us see that our inclination 
to think that a man can follow an order because he has understood it 
(and therefore has a mind) is wrong-headed. In the second example there 
is a double play at work. You feel that a light red and a dark red do not 
have anything in common. You also realize with a jolt that the phrase 
“having something in common” does not have a single meaning, that is, 
that it has different uses. And altogether the effect of the examples is to 
make one begin to see that nothing immaterial, that is, a mind, is needed 
to give life to a dead sign. “But if we had to name anything which is the 
life of a sign, we should have to say that it was its use" (The Blue Book, p. 4).
I hope that these two examples, of a kind with which Wittgenstein’s 
later work is full, will show that in nothing the common features in his 
work and Ch’an Buddhism we are not comparing two philosophies. We are 
comparing things that have been said in the course of two activities. We are 
concerned with what Wittgenstein and a Ch’an Buddhist have done. 
Wittgenstein performs his therapy, mainly on himself, and the Buddhist 
performs his sitting-meditation (in the Rinzai sect with the aid of a koan). 
The similarities we are striking are not of the usual kind that are struck 
between this or that philosophy. It is rather as though we can see that 
Wittgenstein and a Ch’an Buddhist are on the same or very similar paths 
and encounter the same signposts and difficulties.
n
I see as the basic feature common to the work of the Ch’an Buddhist and 
Wittgenstein a “problem,” or the attempt in the work of each to attain to 
non-dualism, that is, a way of looking at as well as behaving toward 
things in which there is room for both mental and physical actions without 
the two being taken or treated as really different from each other. By 
“really different” here is meant that these two kinds of action do not stem 
from two substances, or beings that have independent existence. According 
to this conception of substance a property cannot exist independently from 
a substance, the whiteness, say, of a stone from the stone; but two stones 
can so exist. The move to non-dualism, then, is a move toward wholeness, 
which is on the way to union.
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The term “non-dualism” is used to indicate a way of thinking about the 
mental and the physical in which neither the one nor the other is reduced 
to the other. An example of the latter is any monism such as materialism or 
idealism. In materialism mental actions are taken to be the function of 
the brain. In idealism matter is regarded as an idea of the mind. In either 
case experience is violated, since either mental experiences or physical 
experiences are regarded as somehow not what we experience them to be. 
Furthermore, with either materialism or idealism we have to think of an 
otherwise unnecessary entity that lies behind, beneath, or somehow beyond 
experience: the mind or matter. With non-dualism we can accept it that 
there are these two kinds of experience and at the same time that there is 
no question of their fundamental inter-relatedness. They are two and yet 
one at the same time. Both the Buddhist, then, to describe non-dualism 
otherwise, and Wittgenstein work toward being as completely empirically 
as possible.11
11 An important feature of this work, on which I do not dwell due to limitations 
of space, is that its results are matters of degree. The enlightenment of the Buddhist, 
for example, is not absolute; although the misleading phrase “sudden enlightenment” 
suggests that it is.
That Wittgenstein was moving toward non-dualism in trying to get 
rid of the notion of the mind as something entirely different from all else 
should be apparent from section I. He did not want to deny that there are 
mental states, as will be seen later, only that there is mind and that it is a 
queer kind of thing (PI 93). That the Ch’an Buddhist is moving toward 
non-dualism appears in what follows and particularly with the aid of 
note 13. In seeing through the notions of the mind and the ego Wittgenstein 
and the Buddhists are not concerned to specify what anything is.
m
In noting the profound difference that there is between the Ch’an Buddhist 
and Wittgenstein I said that with “each there is a distinctive method 
as well as a ‘problem.’ ” The “problem” lies in the attempt to move toward 
non-dualism. This constitutes, as noted above, a basic feature common to 
the two. Their dissimilarity is in their different methods for dealing with 
the “problem.” This in turn, however, brings out the fact that the two 
resemble each other in another way: Each developed and employs a dis­
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tinctive method for treating that with which they deal. So that there is a 
feature in common in the fact that each came to employ a method which 
is out of the ordinary, particularly in the respect that it is not what is ordi­
narily thought of as logical or rational.
What I have in mind here may be seen as follows. If you compare PI to 
any other work in Western philosophy, even to the Tractatus, you find that 
it is sui generis. It is marked by having no beginning or end. It simply 
commences and stops. There are no arguments in it and no theories. You 
can say of Plato’s Phacdo that it is about the existence of the soul and its 
immortality. You can say of Locke’s Essay that it is about human under­
standing. Of PI, however, you cannot say, despite some appearances, that 
it is about language. One finds no theory of language in it, as one does in 
the quotation from Augustine with which it opens. It is rather that 
language is being used in it to produce an effect. What is going on in PI 
is a kind of “therapy,” to use one of Wittgenstein’s own words for it (he 
also calls it “philosophy”). “There is not a philosophical method, though 
there are indeed methods, like different therapies” (133). “Philosophy is 
the battle against the bewitchment of our understanding by means of 
language.”12
If, on the other hand, you compare Ch’an Buddhism to other sects of 
Buddhism or to, say, Confucianism, you find that it too is out of the 
ordinary in the respect that it emphasizes a particular method: the one 
which its name signifies, sitting-meditation. In Confucianism there are 
views of the human scene and recommendations concerning it. In Ch’an 
Buddhism there are neither. Indeed, Ch’an Buddhists are well known for 
their turning away from the written word and in particular from its dis­
cursive use. When they do write the results are not philosophical discourse 
in the ordinary sense of that phrase. The results are anecdotes, parables, 
paradoxes, and the records of the sayings of particular teachers on par­
ticular occasions. In this their writings are to be compared to the 7'ao Te 
Ching rather than to the Analects. And it is possible that Eastern Buddhism, 
especially Ch’an, has its distinctive quality from the influence of Taoism 
on the import from India that became Eastern Buddhism.
11 133» author’s translation. I take it that there is an ambiguity in this claim. Lan­
guage bewitches our understanding. (“A picture held us captive. And we could not get 
outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” 
115.) It is, however, also the elixir that Wittgenstein used to dispel the bewitchment.
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The need in each case, the Buddhist and the Wittgensteinian, for a 
distinctive method is related to what I have called the “problem** with 
which each is dealing, and we shall see that the nature of the methods 
depends on the “problem.** Strictly speaking, of course, as the quotation 
marks indicate, they are not dealing with a problem in the same sense 
that mathematicians, physicists, and even most philosophers deal with 
problems; and their methods are not that of rational analysis. They are 
dealing with, in the case of the Buddhist, the delusion of the ego13 14and, in 
the case of Wittgenstein “a picture [that] held us captive’* (i 15) which 
“proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!)” (110). That is to say, each is 
dealing with a condition of being humanly which at some point in our 
development prevents us from seeing clearly, or keeps us looking at things, 
in Spinoza’s metaphors, as if through a cloud or as if we were dreaming 
with our eyes open. The Ch’an Buddhist and Wittgenstein, as the word 
“therapy” suggests, are more like doctors than they are like scientists or 
even most philosophers. As will be noted later, Wang Yang-ming, as well 
as other Teachers, often employed a medical metaphor to speak of what 
he was doing as a Teacher. However, neither the Ch’an Buddhist nor 
Wittgenstein is a doctor in the sense that he deals with a pathological 
condition—except in the very root meaning of “pathological” as referring 
to a paihema or a passion or a passive condition.1*
13 See, for example, Philip Kapleau, The Three Pillars of Zen (Tokyo, 1965), p. 329: 
Ego: According to Buddhism, the notion of an ego, i.e., awareness of oneself as a discrete 
individuality, is a delusion. It arises because, misled by our bifurcating intellect (the 
sixth sense) into postulating the dualism of “myself” and “not-myself”, we are led to 
think and act as though we were a separated entity confronted by a world external to 
us. Thus in the unconscious the idea of “I,” or selfhood, becomes fixed, and from this 
arise such thought patterns as “I hate this, I love that; this is mine, that is yours.” 
Nourished by this fodder, the ego-I comes to dominate the mind, attacking whatever 
threatens its domination and grasping at anything which will enlarge its power. An­
tagonism, greed, and alienation, culminating in suffering, are the inevitable consequences 
of this circular process.
14 In the Notebooks Wittgenstein referred to “the uncaptive mind” and later in PI to 
“a picture [that] held us captive” (22.6.15 and 115) and fundamental to Buddhism is 
the notion of dukkha, or “suffering” as the word is often translated.
I am not doing what either the Buddhist or Wittgenstein does. The present work is 
descriptive, not therapeutic. It will, therefore, not open eyes, though some of the things 
to which it calls attention might. Still, the contrast between the present essay and the 
Buddhists’ and Wittgenstein’s techniques may serve to emphasize the latters’ distinction 
and power.
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IV
Reference in section i to the multitude of examples in Wittgenstein’s 
later work is related to another feature common to Ch’an Buddhism and 
Wittgenstein’s investigations. To disabuse himself and us of the notion that 
we have minds (for understanding the meanings of words) Wittgenstein 
had to attack the suggestion, that all of the mental as well as other words 
seem to have for us, that there is mind: understanding an order, meaning, 
intention, and so on through an extremely large number of them. In a way 
the same thing is being done over and over. The process is like that of 
attacking a hydra: we lop off one head only to find another rearing. There 
is enormous repetition in the work.
Similarly with meditation and the steps of enlightenment. The Zen 
Buddhist even refers to his as “ladder Zen.”15 Day after day he sits in 
meditation. He works with koan after koan. And just as it is the case that 
Wittgenstein never finished his task, so it is the case in Eastern Buddhism 
that there is no final enlightenment. Hakuin wrote that he had experienced 
innumerable small safaris and seven great ones, and that with the last great 
one he realized that all his previous safaris had been illusory.16
15 The Matter of Zen, p. 130. Cf. note 11.
16 Ibid., p. 40.
With Wittgenstein and the Ch’an Buddhist the process is like peeling an 
onion. Wittgenstein in the Preface to PI: “And this was, of course, con­
nected with the very nature of the investigation. For this compels us to 
travel over a wide field of thought crisscross in every direction. . . . The 
same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh 
from different directions, and new sketches made.”
v
Something else in this Preface brings us to another common feature. 
Wittgenstein: “It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this work, 
in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into one brain 
or another—but, of course, it is not likely.”
Huang Po: “Ah, be diligent! Be diligent! Of a thousand or ten thousand
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attempting to enter by this Gate, only three or perhaps five pass 
through.”17
17 John Blofeld, trans., The Zen Teaching of Huang Po (New York, 1959), pp. 131-2. 
Further quotations from Huang Po will be followed by page references to this book in 
parentheses.
The theme of the almost-impossible difficulty of the undertaking appears elsewhere 
when another way of being is involved. “Because strait is the gate, and narrow is the 
way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it .. . For many are called but 
few are chosen.” Matt. 7: 14 and 22: 14.
Since I am not concerned with proving anything, evidence is not amassed. Of the 
difficulty of the task of a Ch'an Buddhist or a Wittgenstein, however, there are countless 
expressions. See, for example, all of The Zen Teaching of Huang Po and Norman Malcolm's 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir (London, 1958).
’• PI 133. Huang Po, p. 53. Cat's Yaum (New York, 1947), p. 41. The Matter of Zen, 
p. 127, but see also ch. 11 “Zazen, not Quietism.”
VI
There is talk of tranquillity in the work of Wittgenstein and the Ch’an 
Buddhist.
Wittgenstein: “The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of 
stopping doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy 
peace so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in 
question” (W 133; here substitute “philosopher” for “philosophy” and 
“himself” for “itself*).
Huang Po: “Not to seek is to rest tranquil.”
Sokei-an: “Zen makes a religion of tranquillity.”
Goto Roshi: “Then his [the Buddha’s] eyes were opened and this brought 
emancipation, Nirvana, which is quiet and calmness.”18
vn
Wittgenstein’s special task in dissolving the problem of the two materials 
became in effect that of trying so to see words (nouns, names) that they 
were not words. And this had to do with the difficulty of his undertaking: 
at its heart lay a contradiction.
In The Blue Book Wittgenstein wrote about what he was doing as well
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as doing it. On p. i in addition to asking, “What is the meaning of a 
word ?” he said: “We are up against one of the great sources of philosophi­
cal bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds 
to it.” He was also talking about what he was doing when he spoke of the 
hint about the dissolution of the problem of dualism.
In The Brown Book there are fewer of these statements about his work. 
PI again has more, but they are a part of the work. It is as though, as the 
method developed, the need to explain what he was doing lessened. 
Nevertheless, there are some statements explicitly about his task, particu­
larly in nos. 89 to 133. In PI 123 we find: “A philosophical problem has 
the form: ‘I don’t know my way about.* ” In 125 this is to some extent 
explained. “It is the business of philosophy, not to resolve a contradiction 
by means of a mathematical or logico-mathematical discovery, but to make 
it possible for us to get a clearer view of the state of mathematics that troubles 
us: the state of affairs before the contradiction is resolved. (And this does 
not mean that one is sidestepping a difficulty.) . . . The civil status of a 
contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical problem 
[first two emphases added].”
The notion that the task is contradictory (and, therefore, impossible; 
cf. section iv) appears later in another form: “What is your aim in 
philosophy?—To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.”1’
A central feature of the sitting-meditation of the Rinzai sect of Zen 
Buddhism is the employment of the koan as an aid to meditation.19 20 One 
of the great koans, JSshu’s (Chao-chou) mu, displays the nature of the heart 
of koans as used for Zen practice: the contradiction. As is the case with 
most koans, it is an anecdote about which the student who is given it is 
19 A fly-bottle is a device for trapping flies. A large dear-glass bottle is provided 
with a black metal top in which there is a hole. In the bottle is bait in the form of pieces 
of meat. Flies enter the bottle in search of food. They are then unable to escape because 
their phototropism leads them anywhere in the bottle except to the dark top where 
there is a means of egress. Their very natures keep them in the bottle. Cf. The Matter 
of Zen, p. 127, quoted below and in note 21.
20 In the use of the koan in the Rinzai sect of Zen Buddhism there is considerable 
similarity between the Buddhists* and Wittgenstein’s methods. Both this use and 
Wittgenstein’s method appeal, to speak, to the intellect. Perhaps for this reason it is 
said that the Rinzai sect is for the intellectual, the Soto sect for the artistic and emotional. 
It must, however, not be forgotten that the koan is employed as an aid to meditation. 
There is this great base on which it sits. In this respect the use of the koan is not at all 
comparable to Wittgenstein’s therapy.
36
BUDDHISM AND WITTGENSTEIN
asked a question, which is his koan; and the anecdote has a background 
that is provided for the student when he is given the koan. The background 
of the mu koan is this. The Buddha said that all sentient beings have Bud­
dha-nature. The anecdote is: One day a monk asked JoshQ (an old 
teacher; in Japanese, a rfishi), Docs the dog have Buddha-nature or not? 
Jdshd replied: Mu\ (which means, no). But how can that be, asked the 
monk; the Buddha said that all sentient beings have Buddha-nature? 
Mu, said J6shG.—The student who is given this koan is then asked: What 
does Joshu’s mu mean? And the student may be told that he has to 
transcend the opposites of existence and non-existence to find the answer.
While I was working with this koan Zuigan Got6 Roshi once said: “I 
have to know when to kill and when to give life.” He was referring to the 
ego. Later he said: “Man is in slavery. The idea is to get free. One can 
imagine one as being trapped in a box. Some try to get free by breaking 
the box. The Mahayana Buddhist method is to get free without breaking 
the box. This is done by looking into oneself. What is the Z? And finding 
that we have to transcend the opposites.”21
21 The Matter of Zen, p. 127. The rest of the quotation is: “Transcending the opposites 
is what the Buddha did for six years. Then his eyes were opened and this brought 
emancipation, Nirvana, which is quiet and calmness. To have the bonds on you makes 
no difference if you are calm.” See also ch. 7 on the koan. The reference to killing is in 
Paul Wienpahl, Zen Diary (New York, 1970), p. 137.
The theme of losing a life to live, and therefore of the contradictory, occurs elsewhere 
in Buddhism as well as in Christianity. In Buddhism it is in the notion of the Great. Death 
(or getting off the wheel of life and death; for which see IsshO Miura and Ruth Fuller 
Sasaki, Zen Dust, Kyoto, 1966, pp. 37, 309, 64, 67). In Christianity there is Matt. 
10: 39: “He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake 
shall find it.”
Cf. note 14. The notion of human servitude is also central in Spinoza.
22 The Matter of Zen, p. 30. Sanzen is a brief visit with a roshi during which the student 
recites his koan and gives an “answer” to it.
Got6 RSshi also said: “Why is there sanzen, you ask? By going through 
contradictions you come to the understanding which goes with mu or being 
nothing.” He had pointed out at another time that contradictions are 
built into us by living, giving as an example: “A child wants something 
and his father says that he cannot have it.”22
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In “Ch’an Buddhism, Western Thought, and the Concept of Substance” 
{Inquiry 14, no. 1, Summer 1971) the Buddhist notion of egolessness is 
compared to Spinoza’s analysis of the Western concept of substance. In 
this analysis Spinoza found that there cannot be plural (more than one) 
substances since a feature of the concept is that a substance is a self- 
existent thing. If there were two each would somehow depend for its ex­
istence on another; for example, you could not think of one without 
thinking of the other because an aspect of one would be that it is not the 
other. In the comparison of egolessness with Spinoza’s analysis it is seen 
that being egoless corresponds to being substance-less.23
33 The Buddha-nature is, in an ungainly term, substancelessness. In conversations 
with Professor David Kalupahana about his book on the Buddhist concept of causality 
(Causality: T7u Central Philosophy of Buddhism, Honolulu, 1975), I saw that the concept is 
in effect the conceiving that all things are without substance (Western sense), and that, 
consequently, they are all “inter-related.** Care must be taken here because “inter­
related” implies that there are things (substances) to be related. Hence the usefulness of 
Spinoza’s phrase “modes of being.**
Having seen that there is not more than one substance (that is, that 
there are not substances, plural), that there is simply Being, Spinoza had 
to ask himself: What, then, to do about the two materials of which Des­
cartes spoke, the mind and the body? His resolution of the question 
consisted in coming to see them as attrib uter of Being. That is to say in 
Carnap’s formal mode of speech, Spinoza came to using the terms “mind” 
and “body” adjectivally (attributively) rather than substantially. There 
are mental and corporeal aspects of Being, not minds and bodies.
In explaining himself in the scholium of Proposition X, Part I of the 
Ethic Spinoza wrote: “From these things it is apparent that, although the 
two attributes are conceived as really distinct, that is, one without the help 
of the other, we cannot nevertheless conclude thence that they constitute 
two beings, or two diverse substances.”
In the transcending of opposites or moving to non-dualism it appears 
that, whenever and wherever it is done, there is this encounter with the 
concept of substance. For in the record of Wang Yang-ming, a century 
earlier and a half a world away, we find Wang, in response to a question, 
advising that “Even if we read ‘renovating the people’ as ‘loving the people’ 
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and say that manifesting the character is the root and loving the people 
is the branches, it is not incorrect. The main thing is that the root and the 
branches should not be distinguished as two different things. The trunk of 
the tree is called the root, and the twigs are called the branches. It is 
precisely because the tree is one that its parts can be called roots and 
branches. . . . What the former scholar said is due to this failure to realize 
that manifesting the character and loving the people are basically one thing. 
Instead he believed them to be two different things and consequently, al­
though he knew that the roots and the branches should be one, yet he could 
not help splitting them in two.”24
24 Wing-tsit Chan, trans., Instructions for Practical Living by Wang Yang-ming (New 
York, 1963), p. 276, emphases added. The passage is also quoted in “Wang Yang-ming 
and Meditation,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 1, no. 2 (March 1974), note 6. The 
question whether Wang was Buddhist or Neo-Confucian is also considered in the 
article. Both for the latter’s and our present purposes I regard him as Buddhist.
Wang’s point is that, although we can speak of two things as different, 
this does not mean that there are two things or beings, of which we are 
speaking. The point is, in other words, precisely Spinoza’s about “mind” 
and “body.” Although we can speak of them as two, this does not mean 
that they are two. The resemblance between Spinoza and Wang is even 
deeper. For Wang says that “It is precisely because the tree is one that its 
parts can be called roots and branches”; and Spinoza could have said 
(though I know nowhere that he did) that it is manifest in experience that 
there is no mind and no body, although there are indeed mental actions 
and corporeal actions. That is, there is one person who does these things, 
and precisely because there is we can speak of the mental and the physical.
We have already noted in section vr that, when Wittgenstein was 
thinking about his new method as well as beginning to use it, he remarked 
parenthetically on p. i in The Blue Book that in the matter of the meaning 
of a word “We are up against one of the great sources of philosophical 
bewilderment: a substantive makes us look for a thing that corresponds to 
it” (emphasis added). He was realizing that there do not have to be sub­
stances (“things” is the more colloquial term) because there are nouns. 
We can talk about there being two different things without there being 
two things. And, of course, this insight plays an enormous role in, if it is not 
the essence of, his substitution of “use” for “meaning” and for his repeated 
comparison of words to tools like hammers, saws, glue-pots, and what not.
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(Wc communicate with language but we also “build roads and machines, 
etc.” with it. PI 491.) This in turn is to see languages as always functioning 
in contexts, as living rather than dead. It is to see language-games as 
forms of life {PI 19, 23, 241), which organic analogy is in its way to see the 
inter-relatedness of all things. However, Wittgenstein always stuck to the 
details and to the task, and did not indulge in such expansion of his work.25
33 And in this too he is like the Ch’an Buddhist.
However, one senses here the shallowness of Wittgenstein's work, or rather its intel­
lectual character. It does not have the substantial character that marks Wang’s, which 
has its roots in sitting-meditation and therefore the body in a deliberate way that 
Wittgenstein’s does not. There is after all the great difference marked to begin with 
between Wittgenstein and Eastern Buddhism.
In this vein and on the roots of Wittgenstein's thought (at least the intellectual roots, 
for there were the two strains in the Tractatus), as well as the Western concept of sub­
stance, it is to be seen that the latter is related to Aristotle’s, and until recently the West’s, 
logic; which is based on the subject-predicate analysis of propositions with its cor­
responding substance-attribute metaphysics. As I remarked, Wittgenstein came into 
philosophy via logic, in particular Russellian logic. The characteristic feature of the 
new relational logic was its analysis of propositions into the form of mathematical 
functions, propositional functions, rather than into a subject plus a predicate. Although 
the variable in a propositional function was conceived to be given a value in the form 
of a name (or substantive), this analysis took some weight from the importance of the 
substantive. Furthermore, it admitted relations as two, three, and more placed predicates 
into consideration. There was little or no room for the relational in Aristotle’s logic.
Now, although Aristotle conceived of a substance as primarily that which is neither 
predicable of nor present in a subject (Categories i* 21-26 21, 3“ 10-4* 21; and Meta­
physics, bk V, ch. 8 and bk vm, ch. 1), there was another element in his conception of a 
substance. This was the notion of identity. For Aristotle primary substances had conti­
nuity in space and time (Categories, ibid.). That is to say, unlike properties and actions 
they had identities. We can say that this is the same Socrates today whom we saw last 
week even though his properties have changed and he is behaving differently. Why? 
Because his substance has not changed. It is the identical Socrates.
There may be a connection here with Wittgenstein's remarks in letters to Russell in 
1913 about identity. “Identity is the very Devil!” “Identity is the very Devil and immensely 
important; very much more so than I thought” (Ludwig Wittgenstein, Letters to Russell, 
Keynes, and Moore, Ithaca, New York, 1974, pp. 29 and 31, emphases Wittgenstein’s). 
Of course, he was involved with the logical concept of identity then. But it is inevitable 
as one sees through substances (egos) that one becomes concerned with identity. To be 
egoless is to lose one’s sense of identity. Only thus does one feel as well as see the inter­
relatedness of all things. And there was Wittgenstein’s note in 1916 about the mystery 
of the I.
At the beginning of the paragraph to which this note refers I said: “When Wittgen-
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IX
Both Wittgenstein and Ch’an teachers used language as opposed, say, to 
describing the nature of reality. In their work words are like scalpels rather 
than elements in theses. They were not concerned with the truth but 
with results. They made their remarks purposefully and to teach. And they 
often brought this out with what may be called “the medical analogy.” 
Wittgenstein once remarked to Moore that “there is now, in philosophy, 
a ‘kink' in the ‘development of human thought’ comparable to that which 
occurred when Galileo invented dynamics . . . that a ‘new method’ had 
been discovered.”26 In The Blue Book (p. 47) he said that “Philosophy as 
we [why not T ?] use the word is a fight against the fascination which 
forms of expression exert upon us.” In PZthis had become: “Philosophy is 
a battle against the bewitchment of our understanding by means of lan­
guage.”27 It is followed by: “ ‘Language (or thought) is something 
unique’—this proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself produced 
by grammatical illusions” (no). “The problems ... are deep dis­
quietudes” (111). “Apicture held us captive. And we could not get outside 
it, for it lay in our language [that is, in our thought?] and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (115). “The results of philosophy 
are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps 
that the understanding has got by running its head up against the limits 
of language” (119, emphasis added). “A philosophical problem has the 
form: ‘I don’t know my way about’ ” (123).28 “The work of the philoso- 
stein was thinking about his new method.” This was also to think about his “problem” 
(see “how the problem of the two materials ... is going to dissolve” on p. 26 above). 
For the “problem” and the new method are in a sense one and the same thing. Or, if 
you prefer, the “problem” generated the method.
16 G. E. Moore, “Wittgenstein’s Lectures in 1930-33,” Philosophical Papers (New 
York, 1959), pp. 26-7, emphasis added. Since so much of Wittgenstein’s later work was 
self-analysis (see the references to the author of the in PZ, especially nos. 89 to
134), the notion that the kink is in the development of human thought may be a projec­
tion. Wittgenstein possibly sensed a kink in the development of his own thought. How­
ever, he may also have sensed the kink in twentieth-century Western thought referred 
to in note 10 above, a kink that has been accompanied by a renewed interest in religion 
as manifested in the turning to Eastern religions.
27 109, author’s translation, emphasis added. “Verhexung” (bewitchment) as a verb 
can also mean to cast the evil eye on.
as Of. the Great Doubt of which the Buddhist speaks. See Zen Dust, pp. 43, 246-7.
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phcr consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (127). “If 
one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never be possible to 
debate them, because everyone would agree to them” (128).
“For the clarity we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But this 
simply means that the philosophical problems should completely disappear.
“The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing 
philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy peace, so that 
it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself in question [Here 
try substituting “the philosopher” for “philosophy” and the masculine 
for the neuter gender].—Instead we now demonstrate a method, by 
examples; and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are 
solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
“There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, 
like different therapies” (133).
“The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an 
illness” (255).
“What is your aim in philosophy?—To show the fly the way out of the 
fly-bottle” (309).
“A main cause of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes 
one’s thinking with only one kind of example” (593).
Now listen to Huang Po in the ninth century: “Morning and night I 
have explained to you that the Void is both One and Manifold. I said this 
as a temporary expedient, but you are building up concepts from it” (p. 53, 
emphasis added).
Huang Po’s great disciple Lin Chi (Rinzai) carried on with: “I have no 
teaching. All I can do for you is to cure your illnesses and release your 
minds from the fetters that bind them.”
“There is no fixed teaching. All I can provide is an appropriate medicine 
for a particular ailment.”29
29 77ic Matter of Zen, pp. 75 and 77.
30 Znr/ruchonj for Practical Living, pp. 11-2. Other quotations from Wang are from 
the same volume.
Turn next to Wang Yang-mi ng in the sixteenth century: “This doctrine 
of knowledge first and action later is not a minor disease and it did not 
come about only yesterday. My present advocacy of the unity of knowledge 
and action is precisely the medicine for that disease.”30
Just before that Wang had said: “What is the objective of desperately 
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insisting on knowledge and action being two different things ? And what is 
the objective of my insisting that they are one? What is the use of insisting 
on their being one or two unless one knows the basic purpose of this doc­
trine” (p. ii, emphasis added).
“Although my idea [that knowledge and action are one] arose as an 
urgent remedial measure, nevertheless the substance of knowledge and 
action is originally like this. It is not that I have promoted or suppressed 
either of them according to my own wishes, and purposely propounded 
such a doctrine carelessly to effect a temporary remedy” (p. 94).
“You need to understand the basic purpose of my doctrine” (p. 201).
“The Teacher said, ‘It is not that the Sage did not want to talk to him 
at all. The Sage was anxious to have everyone become a sage. But people 
vary in endowments. In giving them education, there should be an order. 
If you talk of the nature and destiny of man and things to people below 
average, they do not understand. It is necessary to polish them slowly.’ ”31
31 Pp. 212—13. Note, too, that Wang regarded his work as teaching, as educating or 
leading a pupil out. He did not regard it aa conveying the truth or a theory to a peer. 
He was trying to enlighten his pupils. There is “education” beyond formal instruction, 
say, in mathematics; although in the West until recently we have had few if any institu­
tions for this.
“A friend asked, ‘If during meditation one searches one by one for the 
roots for the love of fame, sex, profit, and so forth, and wipes them out 
completely, is that not comparable to cutting out flesh to patch up a sore ?*
“The Teacher looked very serious and said, ‘This is my formula to cure 
people. It can surely remove the cause of the disease. Is there anything 
better? Even afrer a decade or more people still find it useful. If you do 
not use it leave it alone, but don’t spoil this formula of mine.’ ” (pp. 223- 
224).
We are noting here what I called Wang’s “pragmatism” in “Wang 
Yang-ming and Meditation” (see note 24). He used apparently theoretical 
statements, and quotations, from classical sources to produce an effect in 
his listeners. These statements and quotations were employed as instru­
ments independently of their truth or falsity. A famous instance of this 
occurs in the conversation concerning “the doctrine of the four axioms,” 
recording in section 315 of the Instructions. Two of Wang’s best disciples 
had come to interpret things he had said in opposite ways and when 
asked by these two which interpretation was right, Wang replied that 
both are. He then explained that there are different types of people and 
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what will work with one type will not work with the other. “On that 
day,” recorded Ch’ien Te-hung, “both Ju-chung and I attained some 
enlightenment.”31 2
31 P. 245. Opposite versions of the doctrine of the four axioms had each worked in
its way to produce some enlightenment. So, however, did being told that both versions 
are right. Notice, too, “some enlightenment” rather than “enlightenment.” Cf. note 11 
above.
33 P. 314. Cf. the Preface of Ph “Up to a short time ago I had really given up the 
idea of publishing my work in my lifetime. It used, indeed, to be revived from time to 
time: mainly because I was obliged to learn that my results (which I had communicated 
in lectures, typescripts and discussions), variously misunderstood, more or less mangled 
or watered down, were in circulation.” It is true that Wittgenstein then says, “This 
stung my vanity and I had difficulty quieting it.” Nevertheless he docs express the hope 
later, quoted above at the beginning of section v, that it should fall the lot of his work 
“to bring light into one brain or another.”
3* The Matter of Zen, pp. 126 and 130.
Consider finally something that the translator, Professor Chan, said 
about Wang’s record: “According to Wang’s pupil Hsu Ai, when Wang 
heard that some of his disciples privately recorded his sayings, he dis­
approved, saying that he taught as a physician provides medicine, varying 
from time to time according to the case, and that his sayings were not to 
be followed rigidly.”33
In the twentieth century there is Goto R6shi: “What is the aim of 
sitting? Emancipation. From what? From desires for: excessive honor, 
money, power, sexual pleasure, and sleep. Looked at differently one sits to 
emancipate oneself from life, old age, sickness, and death [In response to 
a question, he said that it is the ideas of these things from which one is trying 
to be rid.]; from seeking impossible things; from the fear of being separated 
from those whom you love. In short, the goal is to be rid of pain and 
suffering.”
“Furthermore, a koan is a way of helping you to cut out your ego.”34
x
In evolving his concept of substance Aristotle formulated the idea of the 
essence of a thing. Having distinguished substances from properties, the 
rock from its color, he then distinguished necessary properties from 
accidental properties. The necessary properties are those which a thing 
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must have in order to be what it is. Accidental properties are those which a 
thing has but are not necessary for its being.35 That I am rational is 
necessary for me to be a man. That I am five feet ten inches tall is an 
accident.
55 In the confusion of Western languages and thought Aristotle’s ousia (being), a 
form of the verb “to be,” became essentia in the Latin; and by transliteration instead of 
translation “essence” in English. For English-speaking people, then, the essence of a thing 
is its essentia] being, or essentially what it is; and there is enormous muddle in the latter, 
for “essence” has come to refer mainly to what is designated by a class-name instead of 
to the being of a particular thing. Ousia also became substantia in Latin, or what stands 
tinder; for Aristotle had often spoken of essential being as that which underlies apparent 
or accidental being. However, it was also due to the fact that esse (to be) was deficient 
in classical T.^rin
Thus, we in the West easily think of the essence of a thing. Indeed 
Aristotle’s formulation of this conception has been basic to the develop­
ment of Western science (i.e., knowledge). Science deals with the essence or 
real being of things. However, as we shall see, the notion of essence is not 
peculiar to the West, for it is also found in Eastern Buddhism. And a battle 
with it seems essential in the move to “complete clarity,” enlightenment, or 
non-dualism. One of Wittgenstein’s major concerns in the Tractatus was 
the question: what is the essence of language? This comes out in The 
Blue Book as it opens with the question: what is the meaning of a word? 
Later in PI the matter is made more explicit.
“We feel as if we had to penetrate phenomena: our [current] investigation, 
however, is not directed towards phenomena ... [it is] therefore a 
grammatical one. Such an investigation sheds light on our problem by 
clearing misunderstanding away” (90). We used to ask “questions as to 
the essence of language, of propositions, of thought.” And these questions 
saw “in the essence, not something that lies already open to view and that 
becomes surveyable by a rearrangement, but something that lies beneath 
the surface. Something that lies within, and which an analysis digs out” 
(92). But the form our problem now assumes is, “ *The essence is hidden 
from usJ ”
In the days of the Tractatus, to paraphrase and abbreviate Wittgenstein 
on pp. 44-51 Qi PI, we thought such things as: “ ‘A proposition is a queer 
thing!’ ” and “ ‘Thought must be something unique.’ ” “Other illusions 
come from various quarters to attach themselves to the special one spoken 
of here. Thought, language, now appear to us as the unique correlate, 
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picture, of the world.” “Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, 
logic, presents an order, in fact the a priori order of the world.”
But as we “battle against the bewitchment of our understanding by 
means of language,” we come to see that “ ‘Language (or thought) is 
something unique’ . . . proves to be a superstition (not a mistake!), itself 
produced by grammatical illusions.”
“ ‘But this is how it is—’ I say to myself over and over again. I feel as 
though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it 
in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter.” Wittgenstein then 
quotes the Tractates in PI 114 and adds: but “A picture held us captive. 
And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably” (115).
Thus was he aware that the notion of the essence of language had bothered 
him. There follow in PI, even as there have preceded these revealing re­
marks, series of examples. “Instead [of what we did before], we now de­
monstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be 
broken off.—Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a single 
problem.
“There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, 
like different therapies” (133). This therapy continues until Wittgenstein 
can say that “Essence is expressed by grammar” (371). In no case is it 
something hidden. Words tell us what things are. In the case of language 
we may say that there are languages but not a language.
The statement that essence is expressed by grammar, however, by no 
means marks the end of the therapy. In PI alone there is all the rest of 
Part I down to 693, and Part II; not to mention Remarks on the Foundations 
of Mathematics and the other writings which have appeared since its publica­
tion. The dissolution of the mind-body “problem” is a seemingly endless 
task. However, we have seen that central to it in Wittgenstein’s investiga­
tions is the stumbling block of the notion, the deep-seated notion that there 
are essences; that is to say, that things are essentially as they are.
It appears that all those who are on the way to non-dualism encounter 
this barrier of essences. We are concerned with Wittgenstein’s investiga­
tions and Eastern Buddhism, but, although I would not insist on this, 
one might see an encounter as early in the East as that almost opening line 
of the Tao Te Ching: The names that can be named are not invariable 
names.
Certainly, however, this is to be found in Lin Chi (Rinzai): “Followers 
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of the Way, make no mistake. Nothing has a nature of its own [an es­
sence]—though names delude us in this.”36 And in his immediate parent 
we find the following at the very outset of his record: “ ‘The Master said 
to me: All the Buddhas and all sentient beings are nothing but the one 
Mind, beside which nothing exists. This ‘Mind/ which is without begin­
ning, is unborn and indestructible. It is not green or yellow and has neither 
form nor appearance? ”37 38
56 The Matter of Zen, p. 78. The notion of the meaning of a word is involved in the 
question of essences. Thus, medieval nominalists in the West might be said to have been 
on the way to non-dualism. As these things are seen, it is realized that the approaches 
to non-dualism are many and varied. As Wittgenstein said, there is not a method in 
philosophy (133).
37 P. 29. Huang's saying corresponds to Spinoza's insight that there are not plural 
substances. Instead there are modes of being. And Spinoza, like Huang, does not say 
what being is (which is why Huang's term, translated as “Mind,” seems obscure). Basi­
cally, then, no thing has a substance and, consequently, no essence. From the outset, 
as one reads Huang one sees that it is of the essence of non-dualism for him that one sees 
through essences, that is, this seems for Huang to be at the core of non-dualism.
38 In Spinoza’s terminology: apart from Being. (However, in translation even Huang 
has it this way: “But whether they transcend conceptual thought by a longer or a 
shorter way, the result is a state of Being’* p. 34.) Compare the previous quotation with
“The one Mind alone is the Buddha, and there is no distinction between 
the Buddha and sentient things, but that sentient beings are attached to 
forms, and so seek externally for Buddhahood” (p. 29, emphasis added; 
for “forms” read “essences”). “They do not know that, if they put a stop 
to conceptual thought and forget their anxiety, the Buddha will appear 
before them, for this Mind is the Buddha, nor are there any other Buddhas 
or any other mind. It is bright and spotless as the void, having no form or 
appearance whatever. To make us of your minds to think conceptually is 
to leave the substance and attach yourself to the form” (p. 30, the transla­
tor is using “substance” and “form” in their Eastern senses).
And so it goes throughout the Ch’an teaching of Huang Po. “Let there 
be a silent understanding and no more. Away with all thinking and 
explaining. Then we may say that the Way of Words has been cut off and 
movements of the mind eliminated” (pp. 35-36). “When people of the 
world hear it said that the Buddhas transmit the Doctrine of Mind, they 
suppose that there is something to be attained or realized apart from the 
Mind.”3’ On almost every page one sees that at the heart of the matter 
there is the seeing through of essences, “g,: Then individual objects do 
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exist? A: The existence of things as separate entities and not as separate 
entities are both dualistic concepts. As Bodhidharma said: ‘There are 
separate entities and there are not, but at the same time they are neither 
the one nor the other, for relativity is transient.’ ” (p. 126). It is both 
correct and not correct to say that there are or are not separate entities. 
But if you stick with either you are stuck with an essence. “Yes, my advice 
is to give up all indulgence in conceptual thought and intellectual pro­
cesses. When such things no longer trouble you, you will unfailingly reach 
Supreme Enlightenment. On no account make a distinction between the 
Absolute and the sentient world. As a real student of Ts’ao Hsi Zen 
you must make no distinctions of any kind” (p. 130).
I conclude this section with the Zen story of the fan. A Teacher handed 
one disciple a fan and asked him what it was. The disciple handed it back 
and said: “A fan.” The Teacher frowned and handed it to another pupil. 
This man said not a word. Instead he scratched his back with the fan, 
poked the hibachi with it, opened it, fanned himself; then, placing a gift 
on it, he handed it to the Teacher. The Teacher smiled.39
Wittgenstein’s: “The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes 
the conflict between it and our requirement (for the crystalline purity of logic was, of 
course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement)*' 107; and “To repeat: don’t 
think, but look” 66. Huang's reference to “the Way of Words” in the present context 
suggests the inter-relation between the notion of essences and language. To see through 
or be clear about essences is to be dear about language, and therefore about what 
Huang calls “conceptual thought” in the sequd. Gf. Wittgenstein’s “Language (or 
thought)” above (section ix) and note 36.
39 The Matter of Zen, p. 124; see also ch. 12, note 7. In Cat's Yawn, p. 4, Sokei-an Roshi 
gives a different version.
XI
In both Buddhism and Wittgenstein there is talk of light and clarity instead 
of knowledge.
Wittgenstein: “It is not impossible that it should fall to the lot of this 
work, in its poverty and in the darkness of this time, to bring light into 
one brain or another” (Preface, PI). “For the clarity we are aiming at is 
indeed complete clarity” (133).
“Buddha” comes from a Sanskrit verb meaning to awaken, to enlighten, 
to understand.
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Huang Po: “Thus, those who seek the goal through cognition are like 
the fur (many), while those who obtain intuitive knowledge of the Way 
are like the horns (few)” (p. 32). “If he could really accomplish this, he 
would receive Enlightenment in a flash” (p. 45). “The fruit of attaining 
the sramana stage is gained by putting an end to all anxiety; it does not 
come from book-learning” (p. 55). “Because my Way is through Mind­
awakening. How can it be conveyed in words?” (p. 67). “Yes, my advice 
is to give up ail indulgence in conceptual thought and intellectual proc­
esses. When such things no longer trouble you, you will unfailingly reach 
Supreme Enlightenment” (p. 130).
xn
There is no doubt that, when Wittgenstein made the remarks about 
identity to Russell reported in note 25, he was thinking of the logical 
sign of identity, as in “a = a.” (We should not, though, forget his answer 
to Russell’s question: What are you thinking of, logic or your sins? Both, 
replied Wittgenstein—see note 7.) This comes out in the Trac/oAu after 
Wittgenstein concluded that all propositions may be regarded as truth­
functions of elementary propositions and noted that propositions like 
“ ‘p’ is a proposition” seem to be an exception to this. They must therefore 
be analyzed.
When this is done for “ *p’ is a proposition” the latter turns out to be 
a pseudo-proposition. Its appearance as a proposition rests upon a mis­
taken conception of identity, the conception that identity is a relation 
between objects. In fact it must be regarded as a relation between signs, 
and the sign of identity “a = a,” as a means of substituting one sign for 
another and thus not an essential constituent of logical notation. That 
identity is not a relation between objects may be seen from the fact that, 
if it were one, one could not say that two objects have all their properties 
in common. Now, however, this may be true but it is never significant. 
That it may never be true is not logically necessary. It is only accidental.
“The identity sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of logical 
notation.” Therefore, propositions like “a = a” and “ *p’ is not a proposi­
tion” “cannot be written in correct logical notation at all.” “So all pro­
blems disappear which are connected with such pseudo-propositions.”40
Trattatus, 5.533, 5.534, and 5.535.
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However, as I noted in “Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation” (see 
note 5), there were two strains of thought in Wittgenstein in those years: 
the non-dualistic (I was then calling it misleadingly the “monistic”) and 
the dualistic. They might also be called the “mystical” and the “logical.” 
In the entry in the Notebooks dated 2.8.16 Wittgenstein wrote: “My work 
has extended from the foundations of logic to the nature of the world.” He 
also said: “Then the world itself is neither good nor evil”; and “Isn’t the 
thinking subject in the last resort a mere superstition?” These and the 
earlier “A man lives eternally if he lives in the present” and “Live happily!”
(8.7.16) are examples of the non-dualistic strain. On the other hand, there 
arc: “And the subject is not a part of the world, but a boundary of the 
world.” “Here the nature of the subject is completely veiled,” and “The 
thinking subject is surely mere illusion. But the willing subject exists”
(2.8.16) , which are examples of the dualistic strain.41
41 In the same entry Wittgenstein wrote: “I am conscious of the complete unclarity 
of these sentences.”
Wittgenstein once said to John Wisdom at Cambridge, "What is troubling us is the 
tendency to believe that the mind is like a little man within.” In the Gat's Yawn, p. 4, 
Sokei-an Roshi wrote: "Ego is that something which may be termed the supervisor 
within oneself. It is like the king ... or the master of a concern.” (I used this comparison 
in "Zen and the Work of Wittgenstein”; see note I.)
When I wrote “Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation” I thought that 
these two strains could not be reconciled, that they crossed but did not 
mingle. Now I think that they can be reconciled and that they do mingle. 
In such logical work as that which led Wittgenstein to see through the con­
ception of identity he was also beginning to see through the I which, as he 
noted on 5.8.16 “is what is deeply mysterious.” To see that identity is not 
a relation between objects is part of seeing through personal identity, or 
in Buddhist terms seeing through the “ego” (notice the intensity of 
Wittgenstein’s letters to Russell quoted in note 25).
That this may be so is confirmed in the Tractatus from 5.6 to 5.641 when 
Wittgenstein realizes a result of his seeing that propositions are not names, 
that is, that the proposition is the propositional sign. If this be so, there 
is no I in the sense of a soul, or as Wittgenstein calls it “the metaphysical 
subject.” “The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing” 
(5-631)-
This theory of propositions gets rid of the need to think of something in 
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addition to the propositional sign, the proposition. It consequently gets 
rid of the need to think of a mind (soul) as the agent for apprehending pro­
positions. Unfortunately, as was pointed out earlier, it depends on the idea 
of the naming relation which requires that there be symbols (Wittgenstein’s 
terminology) in addition to signs; that is, that there be meanings of words. 
This in turn once again requires that we speak of the mind. So the job has 
to be done again. Hence the later investigations.
By the time of The Blue Book, and when he was teaching others to see 
through the naming relation and hence the need for thinking of a mind 
which apprehends the meanings of words, Wittgenstein was much more 
relaxed about the I. There from the middle of p. 61 to the end of the book 
he considers the grammar of the word “I.” And in a relaxed fashion. He 
was apparently no longer concerned with the I. He helps us to see, for 
example, what he calls the “subjective” and the “objective” uses of “I” 
(“I have grown six inches” and “I try to lift my arm”—p. 66) and calls 
attention to the many criteria there are for personal identity. He concludes 
that last section of the book with: “The kernel ofour proposition is that that 
which has pains or sees is of a mental nature only, that the word T in ‘I 
have pains’ does not denote a particular body, for we can’t substitute for 
T a description of a body” (p. 74). “I” helps us to say various things in 
various ways, but it is no longer regarded as the name of a mental entity. 
In The Brown Book there is no discussion of the I, and in PI only four sec­
tions are devoted to it—398, 404-5, and 410, in which things similar to 
those in The Blue Book are suggested about “I.”
It must be apparent in what has been said so far that the concern with 
the I or the ego, and consequently with identity, is absolutely central to 
Eastern Buddhism. The whole point of the practice of zazen is to see 
through the illusion of the ego. And as this happens one loses one’s sense 
of identity and consequently feels atonement (at-one-ment) and becomes 
one with the world. Wittgenstein, too, was enormously concerned with the 
I, the deeply mysterious I, and he came to see that there are languages, 
not a language. He saw that words function in living contexts as the 
picture which had held him captive dissolved. This is rather a way of 
feeling at one with the world.
However, we are back to the tremendous difference that was struck at 
the beginning between Wittgenstein and the Ch’an Buddhist. This is the 
difference in method. Wittgenstein’s was logical, then grammatical— 
intellectual, if you will. It studies the grammar of “I.” Whereas with the 
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Buddhist’s one grapples with the ego. So, despite the common features we 
have noted, there remains the enormous difference.
xni
In concluding I note that with each of these different methods there is 
agreement in encountering with them certain key features: a move toward 
non-dualism; a distinctive though different method for accomplishing the 
work; the repetition in it; the notion that the task is impossible; talk in the 
work of tranquillity; the encounters with contradiction, and the notion of 
substance; the pragmatism in each; the encounter with the notion of 
essence; the talk of clarity and light rather than knowledge; and the 
encounter with the notion of the I, the ego, or identity.
These are apparently sign-posts on the way to non-dualism or the 
acceptance of both the mental and the physical without the illusion that 
they are two really different things. That the Buddhist gets to this is re­
flected in the saying that we should “on no account make a distinction 
between the Absolute and the sentient world” (see above section x). 
That Wittgenstein was at it is reflected in his remarks on behaviorism in 
PI (307 and 308, for example). Pl 308 concludes: “So we have yet to deny 
the uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it 
looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we do not want 
to deny them” (only explanations of them). Compare to the Buddhist’s: 
“Before I studied Zen mountains were mountains and rivers rivers. As I 
studied it mountains were not mountains and rivers not rivers. After I had 
studied it mountains were mountains and rivers rivers.” Wittgenstein' 
“Philosophy gives peace.”42
43 This touches on a point of comparison for the examination of which there is not 
space in this article. Both the Buddhist and Wittgenstein work to bring about a change 
in the individual, to dispel illusions.
The Zen account about mountains, etc. is reported in D. T. Suzuki, Essays in Zen 
Buddhism I (London, 1927), p. 12.
The use of both of these methods results in human beings who speak of 
another way of being consciously than the rational. Wittgenstein called it 
“complete clarity,” the Buddhist calls it “awakening” or “enlightenment.” 
It is a way of being consciously in which what are called philosophical 
problems dissolve or disappear. Wittgenstein', “The real discovery is the 43
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one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want 
to” (133). Huang\ “We just know how to put all mental activity to rest and 
then achieve tranquillity. We certainly do not begin by thinking things 
out and end up in perplexity” (p. 57).
I have shown elsewhere,43 so that there is no need for details here, 
that the human beings on this way exemplify a way of being humanly 
which is not new but to which little attention has been paid. It has either 
been regarded as mysterious (mystical) or it has been ignored. In making 
the comparison between Eastern Buddhism and Wittgenstein I have had 
in mind showing that the development is neither a peculiarly Eastern nor 
Western phenomenon. It is a human phenomenon.
43 In Tfo Radical Spinoza, p. 31.
44 Ibid., p. 32. Wang Yang-ming: “From here it is extended to humaneness to all 
people and love to all things” (Instructions, p. 57). For a more recent expression turn to 
Sokei-an Roshi: “Zen Students must experience this peculiar love” (“The Religion of 
Tranquillity” in Cat’s Yawn, p. 41; see note 18). Wittgenstein does not seem to have 
got this far in his work.
This way of being consciously may be briefly characterized as follows. 
It is a way of being consciously-of-things without the media of what 
Spinoza called “images”; that is, any representations of things, including 
seeing- and hearing-images. Of them the chief, perhaps, are words. (Away 
with the books, says the Buddhist. “Don’t think, look,” says Wittgenstein.) 
This may be why Ch’an Buddhism eschews scriptures and why Wittgen­
stein’s method seems shallow compared to the Buddhists’, though the 
Buddhists also use words, as in the koan-study.
This way of being consciously is direct. The way of imagination is 
indirect. With the latter we believe that we can be conscious of universals. 
But in this we mistake a means of knowing (concepts, words) for the object 
of knowing, which is always a particular thing. This way of knowing also 
requires the whole person. It is physical as well as mental. And the Bud­
dhists as well as Spinoza are aware that it is therefore indistinguishable 
from loving.43 4
Paying attention to the common features noted in this paper shows us 
other things about this way of being consciously: for example, the way to 
it involves a break with logic, for we see that on the way is contradiction. 
The medical analogy, too, suggests that we need a teacher for coming to 
it, even as we needed teachers to be conscious rationally. However, I shall 
not go through the list of features we have noted and indicate how each
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sheds light on this way of being consciously. My purpose has been only to 
call attention to them. For they are all aspects of non-dualism.
Thus, I have finally to say, now at the end of this paper, that non-dualism 
is basically a process or activity rather than a view of things; or that it is 
the other as well. It would be dualistic to really separate the methods 
from the results. These features illuminate this way of being consciously 
because it is non-dualistic to realize that the methods and the results are 
not really distinct.
The distinctiveness of the methods shows this. Non-dualism is the process 
of getting through the illusion of the I or ego, part of which is the illusion 
that mind or minds are really different from all other things that we ex­
perience. The dualism into which we naturally fall as we mature as human 
beings is basically the dualism of the mind (I, ego, self) and all else. It is 
also the real separation of method and result. Everything seems different 
from the mind or ego until we can see through these illusions. And the 
seeing through in all of its features is part of being non-dualistically. The 
process does not end, and the methods themselves are different from what 
is ordinarily thought of as rational. That is, there is another way of being 
consciously than the rational, and it is marked by the features common to 
Buddhism and Wittgenstein.
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